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MAINTENANCE AND CURE AND FARRELL V. UNITED STATES
STANLEY DONALD MORRISON*

With the recent handing down of the five-four decision in Farrell v.
United States1 another page was turned in the development of the ancient
remedy of maintenance and cure which the Admiralty awarded to its
wards, that is to say "seamen." The opinion for the majority of the court
was written by Mr. Justice Jackson; the opinion for the minority of the
court was written by Mr. Justice Douglas. The facts of the case are unprecedented in the horrendous tale of the pains, woes, and injuries of the
maritime employed. These facts tell us that seaman William Farrell, aged
but twenty-two, who had enlisted in the Merchant Marine on November
15, 1942, while in Naples, Italy, signed on the S.S. James E. Haviland on
December 16, 1943, as a seaman with the grade of an oiler. The vessel was
a merchantman, though owned by the United States War Shipping Administration to transport both troops and cargo. On February 5, 1944, the
vessel being docked at Palermo, Sicily, Farrell was granted shore leave
until 6 P.M. of the same day. He was warned of no danger by the master.
Farrell spent his time ashore sightseeing and, obviously, did some drinkingthough there was no absolute finding that lie was grossly intoxicated from
excessive indulgence. At approximately 8 P.M., two hours overleave, with
another seaman, he started back to the ship, and in so doing, there being
rain and darkness,3 lie lost his way and was improperly directed to the
wrong gate, all of which placed him about a mile from where the ship
lay. Farrell's companion, who was approximately forty to fifty feet away,
*LL.B., University of Michigan; member of N.Y. Bar.

1.336 U.S. 511 (1949).
. As to who isa "seaman" and for just what purposes one isto be classified as a
"seaman" see Int. Steve. Co. v.Haverty, 72 U.S. 50 (1926) a case which was the 'open
sesame' to the maritime employed, though itisvery questionable whether the begetters
of the Jones Act, 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1920) ever conceived such a
result. See also Robinson, 'The Seaman in American Admiralty Law," 16 B.U.L. REv.
283 (1936). A culmination of Haverty was the five to three decision in Seas Shipping
Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946), which opinion is noted in 34 CALIF. L. REv. 601
(1946). For the most complete treatment of the subject of "Who is a Seaman" see
I NORRIS, THE LAW OF SEAMEN (1951) ch. 1. The Haverty decision held a longshoreman injured while working on a vessel in navigable waters to be a "seaman" within the
meaning of the Jones Act. But a longshoreman injured while aboard a vessel is not a
"seaman" for purposes of maintenance and cure. C. Flanagan & Sons, Inc. v. Carken,
11 S.W.2d 392 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928), noted in 42 HARv. L. REv. 820 (1929). See
Calvino v. Farley, 23 Supp. 654 (S.D.N.Y.) 1938). Though this may appear to be
illogical, it is to be remembered that the longshoreman has his compensation if his
injury is "maritime" under the Federal Longshoreman's Act, 44 STAT. 1424 (1927), 33
U.S.C. § 901 et. seq. (1927), or ifhis injury is"local" under the state compensation
act, Grant Smith Porter Co. v. Rohde, 257 U.S. 469 (1922). See ROBINSON, AIMIRALTY
.(1938) § 14. See also, though the injury occurred ashore and was a Jones Act suit,
Swanson v. Marra Bros. Inc., 328 U.S. 1 (1916).
3. Palermo, on February 5,1944, was under wartime conditions of blackout though
the Bodaglio Armistice was signed on September 2, 1943. The accounting for this was
that Palermo was used as a port to support the advancing front lines and was also the
Headquarters of General Eisenhower.
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saw 'Farrell fall over a guard chain into a drydock which was sufficiently
lighted for night work then in progress. The consequence of this fall is
that William Farrell is now totally and permanently blind. He suffers,
and will continue to suffer posttrauinatic convulsions, which will probably
become more frequent. There is absolutely no possibility of cure. He will
continuously require medical care to combat attacks of headaches and
epileptic convulsions. Initially, these injuries were treated, without expense
to Farrell, in several government hospitals. On June 30, 1944, he was discharged at Norfolk, Virginia, as completely disabled, though he had received the maximum possible cure. The Supreme Court, in affirming the
decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, 4 held that the shipowner need not furnish a lifelong maintenance and cure. However, the
majority of the court did further say that
The Government does not contend that if Farrell receives
future treatment of a curative nature he may not recover in a
new proceeding the amount expended for such treatment and for
maintenance while receiving it."
Accordingly no lump sum award could be made.
The result in Farrell represents the culmination of a remedy given
for centuries. At least broadly it answers the question of the length of time
for which the mariner is entitled to his maintenance and cure. To understand the remedy and its application to Farrell a survey of it is here being
undertaken.
Though the remedy of maintenance and cure bears similarity to workmen's compensation legislation, there is a distinction that can be drawn
between the two. ' Workmen's compensation is the product of a statuto,
scheme; but maintenance and cure, in view of the confinement, restriction, and susceptibility to dauger of the sailor's life at sea, is of origin coinparatively ancient in time.7 Many, though not all,8 of the old maritime
codes of the world made provision for it whether the seaman was injured
or became ill while in the service of his vessel. 9 Of these codes The Laws
4.
5.
6.
7.

Farrell v. United States, 167 F.2d 781 (2d Cir. 1948).
Supra note I at 519.
This distinction will be noted later in the body of the article.
ROBiNsoN, ADMIRALTY (1939) § 36.
8. See the Dantzic Ship Laws and the Maritime Laws of the Osterlings in Flanders
in IV BLAcK BOOK OF TiE ADMIRALTY (as edited by Sir Travers Twiss) at pp. 336-383.
It is to be observed that the mariner's sea-sickness, disabling him from duty, would see
him not receive his wages for the voyage. Art. VII of the Maritime Laws of the Osterlings, IV BLACK Boor OF TSIE ADMIRALTY 363. However, if he did receive some part
of his wages, and then the disabling sea-sickness occurred, the paid wages would be
subject to forfeiture and would be divided in equal portions between the master and the
remaining mariners. Laws of Hamburg, IV BLACK BooK OF TiE ADMIRALTY 363, n. 2.
9. The following are the Old Sea Codes which provided for maintenance and cure:
(a) The Laws of the Ilanse Towns, Articles XXXV, XXXIX, XLV.
(b) The Laws of Oleron, Articles VI and VII. This law is the foundation
of all the European Codes. The earliest French Edition was published in 1485.

4

BENEDICT, ADMIRALTY § 662 (6th ed. 1940).
() The Laws of \Visbuy, Articles XVIII and XIX.

d) The Marine Ordinances of Louis XIV, Articles XI and XII of Mantime Contracts, Title Fourth, of the Contracts and Wages of Seamen.
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of Oleron are "admitted to be the foundation of all the European maritime
codes."' 1 Articles VI and VII of these Laws, in broadly defining the remedy, made the provisions for maintenance and cure." Another of these
ancient sea codes is the Laws of the Hanse Towns - Article XXXV of
which was distinguished away by the majority in Farrel 12 - which made
provisions for maintenance and cure in the three following articles:
Article XXXV
The seamen are obliged to defend the ship against rovers, on

pain of losing their wages; and if they are wounded, they shall be
healed and cured at the general charge of the concerned in a corn.mon average. If anyone of them is maimed and disabled, he shall
be maintained as long as he lives by a like average. (Italics supplied).
Article XXXIX
If any seaman is wounded in the ship's service, he shall be
cured at the charge of the ship, but not if he is wounded otherwise.
Article XLV
If any mariner falls sick of any disease, he shall be put ashore
and maintained in like manner as if he was on shipboard, and be
attended by another mariner. However, the master is not obliged
to stay for him, if he recovers his health, he shall be paid his wages
as much as if he had served out the whole voyage; and in case he
dies, his heirs shall have what was due him.' 3
e) The Cotland Sea Laws, Article XXI.
f) The Amalphitan Table, Article XIV, gives the seaman the right

"beyond his aforesaid share . . . if he be taken with any infirmity."
(g) The Purple Book of the Bruges, Articles XXI and XXII.
h) Sea Laws in Flanders, Article VII.
i) Ordinances and Customs of the Sea, published by the Consuls of the
City of Trani, Article X.
For historical data generally appertaining to these old Sea Codes, to the approximate
date of each, and to the geographical location of their proceators, see 4 BENEDICT, AnMIRALTY 343-358 (6th ed. 1940) and the notes therein.
10. Quoted from 4 BENEDICT, ADMIRALTY § 662 (6th ed. 1940).
11. Article VI: "If any of the mariners hired by the master of any vessel, go out
of the ship without his leave, and get themselves drunk, and thereby there happens
contempt to their master, debates or fighting and quarreling among themselves, whereby
some happen to be wounded in this case the master shall not be obliged to get them
cured, or in anything to provide for them, but may turn them and their accomplices out
of the ship; and if they make words of it, they are to pay the master besides: but ifb
the master's orders and commands any of the ship's company be in the service of the
ship, and thereby happen to be wounded or otherwise hurt, in that case they shall be
cured and provided for at the costs and charges of the said ship." Article VII: "If it
happens that sickness seizes on any one of the mariners, while in the service of the
ship, the master ought to set them ashore, to provide lodging and candlelight for him,
and also to spare him one of the ship's boys, or hire a woman to attend him, and likewise
to afford him such diet as is usual in the ship; that is to say, so much as he had on
shipboard in his health, and nothing more, unless it please the master to allow it to
him; and if he will have better diet, the master shall not be bound to provide it for him,
unless it be at the mariner's own cost and charges; and if the vessel be ready for her
departure, she ought not to stay for the said sick party but if he recover, he ought to
have his full wages, deducting only such charges as the master has been at for him.
And if he dies, his wife or next of kin shall have it."
12. 336 U.S. 511, 514-515 (1948).
13. These, as well as other of the Old Sea Codes, are collected in 30 Fed. Gas.
1171-1216; appendices to I and IIof PETER'S ADMIRALTY DECISIONS (1807); Vol's II,
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The first major exposition of the remedy was made by Mr. Justice
Story (on Circuit) in the case of Harden v. Gordon, 14 which Case can well
be taken as the American Statement of the Law of Maintenance and Cure.
In the Harden case, Mr. Justice Story had been unable to find "a single
instance in which the maritime laws of any country throw upon seamen
disabled or taken sick in the services of the ship, without their own fault,
15
the expenses of their cure."'
More concretely, however, for present purposes, the early case of Reed
v. CanfieldI6 has greater bearing upon the subject matter of our inquiry
as there involved was actually a type of shore leave fact situation, whereas
the Harden case did not involve such an aggregation of facts. In the Reed
case, seaman Canfield brought an in personam action against Reed and
others for compensation for expenses which lie had incurred to receive
medical cure. Canfield's vessel had just returned to Massachusetts from
the Pacific. The mates desired to go ashore (a departure from their duty),
taking with them a boat crew who had volunteered for the occasion. Among
the boat crew was Canfield. They landed in New Bedford, dined at the
home of the boat-steerer, and departed for the vessel. The weather then
violently changed, the boat became entangled in ice, and was driven out into
the bay where it remained for over twenty-four hours before shore relief
could reach it. Canfield's toes were so severely frozen that they had to be
amputated, For medical care and aid Canfield brought his libel in personarn.
Mr. Justice Story held Canfield to be "inthe service of the ship":
If the maritime law were the same in all respects with the
common law, and if the rights and duties of seamen were measured
in the same manner, doubtless the cases would furnish a strong
analogy. But the truth is that the maritime law furnishes entirely
different doctrines upon this, as well as many other subjects, from
the common law. Seamen are in some sort co-adventurers upon
the voyage; and lose their wages upon casualties, which do not affect artisans at home. They share the fate of the ship in cases of
shipwreck and capture. They are liable to different rules of discipline and sufferings from landsmen. The policy of the maritime
law, for great, and wise, and benevolent purposes, has built up
peculiar rights, privileges, duties, and liabilities in the sea service,
which do not belong to home pursuits. The law of the ocean may
be said in some sort to be a universal law, gathering up and bindIII, IV of the BLAcz BooK OF THE ADMIRALTY (as edited by Sir Travers Twiss). See
also 4 BENEDIcT, op. cit. supra note 10, pp. 343-358; ROBINSON, ADMIRALTY, § 36;
LAw (1945), pp. 56-57; and MCFEE, THE LAw OF THE
(1950). (The latter twro works are simplified surveys. See further, note 15, pp. 247,
of "The Tangled Seine: Survey of Maitime Personal Injury Remedies." 57 YALE L.J, 243
AXTELL, MERCHANT SEAMEN'S

SEA

,1947).
14. 11 Fed. Cas. 480, Fed. Cas. No. 6,047 (1823).
15. Id. at p. 482.
16. 20 Fed. Cas. 426, Fed. Cas. No. 11,641 (1832).
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ing together what is deemed most useful for the general inter-

7
course, and navigation, and trade of all nations.'
He held Canfield not to have been "grossly negligent" - which would
have defeated the right to the award - in not returning to the ship at
at earlier hour, saying that:
Ordinary negligence, consistent with entire good will and a
sober intention to comply with duty, and, much less, slight negligence, ought not to be visited with so severe a forfeiture. Repentance, and a return to duty, even after a fault, are not in the maritime law visited with extraordinary severity. It is rather the tendency to wink at slight offenses, and to punish those which are
gross and deeply injurious to the ship's service. It does not appear
to me, that, in the present case, there was any gross negligence or
any unreasonable delay,18on the part of the boat's crew, in willful
disobedience to orders.
Thus far we can say that the seaman becomes entitled to his maintenance and cure if his hurt is incurred while "in the service of the ship"
and not as a consequence of his own "gross negligence." In The Osceola,',
Mr. Justice H. B. Brown, speaking for a unanimous court, though not in a
shore leave fact situation, after a "full review" of all the authorities, said

...That the vessel and her owners are liable, in case a seaman

falls sick, or is wounded, in the service of his ship, to the extent
of his maintenance and cure, and to his wages, at least so long as
the voyage is continued. (Italics supplied)20
We can also gather from the opinions in the Harden and Reed cases
that the remedy is enclasped within the warm embrace of liberality of
application, dedicated to the firm purpose of compensating those who
perhaps need it most, and used as a vehicle to maintain, not only the dignity, but the manpower worth of the Merchant Marine. Our question, however, then becomes just how liberal is "liberality of application" to be?
A peculiarity of the remedy is that it is more a relational duty of the
shipowner to the seaman rather than one sounding in contract or upon
delict. 2' Though similar to workmen's compensation it is nowhere the
product of a statutory scheme save in England.22 Itdoes not arise out of
tort because there need be no finding of fault upon the vessel.23 "Nor is
17. id. at 428.

It is interesting to compare this last sentence of Justice Story with

the language of Mr. Justice Holnes in the Western Maid, 257 U.S. 419, 432 (1922) that
"There is no mystic overlaw to which even the United States must bow." The decision
in the Western Maid was sharply criticized by Judge Hough. The decision is to be
compared with a later opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes in The Thekla, 266 U.S. 328
(1924). The writer in 38 I-lARv. L. REv. 679 (a note) finds the cases indistinguishable.
18. 20 Fed. Cas. 426, 430 (1832).
19. 189 U.S. 158 (1903).

20. Id. at p. 175. A master is also a "seanan" for purposes of the remedy as well

as a "seaman" within the meaning of the Jones Act. However, ef. §§ 901 and 903(1)
of the Federal Longshoreman's Act, 44 STAT. 1424, which expressly excludes the master
and crew of a vessel from its provisions.

21. See Sims v. U.S., 1951 A.M.C. 461, 463, 464 (3d Cir, 1951).
22. Merchant Shipping Act, 17 and 18 Viet., Ch. 104, § 228.
23. In Cresci v. Standard Fisheries Co., 7 F.2d 379 (N.D. Cal. 1925), the court
rejected the tort limitation though having its choice between the tort and contract provisions for limitation.
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it strictly contractual in the sense that its incidents are written into the
articles."24 It is a duty arising from the employment, but "contractual it
is in the sense that it has its source in a relation which is contractual in
origin, but, given the relation, no agreement is competent to abrogate the
incident." 25 Thus, it attaches to a status, but a status begotten by the
signing of articles - a contractual relation in form, though the articles
and the Federal statutes thereon say nothing as to maintenance and cure.26
But as the remedy can be said to be an implied condition of contract and,
at least, having some roots in contract, it was not without difficulty that
in the reecnt case of Sperbeck v. A. L. Burbank 6 Co. it was held that a
claim for maintenance money did not abate when the seaman died before
trial. Though there was no precise authority in point, it is submitted that
the result reached is sound though in its rationality it is aggravating nomenclature which in fact does not exist. To say, as the court did, that the

remedy was "sufficiently contractual" to avoid abatement is to arbitrarily
select words with purpose of reaching a result only. "Sufficiently contractual"
is not tantamount to actual "contract." A better solution would be that as
the seaman's wages do survive - and this is historically supported28 - then
so should his maintenance and cure, the latter including as one of its elements a claim for wages.2 "1 Yet is not to be forgotten that the shipping
articles expressly provide for wages but not for maintenance and cure. But
whatever logic is used to support the result in the Sperbeck case, the liberality of the bestowing of the remedy calls for the extension that there
was made.
Insofar as the remedy is not a delictual one, it is only some gross act
of indiscretion or culpable misconduct a" of the seaman that will bar the
24. RoinNsoN, ADMIRALTY, 293 (1939).
25. Mr. Justice Cardozo in Cortes v. Bait. Ins. Line, 287 U.S. 367 (1932).
26. See I NORRIs, TnlE LAW OF SEAMEN §§ 87, 88, 98-105, 107-115 (1951). The
form of the Shipping Articles can be found on pp. 582-594. The relevant statutes are
60 STAT. 1097 (1946), 46 U.S.C. § 563 (1946); 60 STAT. 1097 (1946), 46 U.S.C. 564
(1946); 46 U.S.C. 565 (1946); 19 STAT. 252 (1946), 46 U.S.C. 566 (1946); 38 STAT.
1164 (1946), 46 U.S.C. 569 (1946); 60 STAT. 1097 (1946), 46 U.S.C. 570 (1946);
23 STAT. 58 (1946), 46 U.S.C. 572 (1946); 23 STAT. 58 (1946), 46 U.S.C. 573 (1946);

REV.

STAT.

§ 4520 (1946), 46 U.S.C. § 574 (1946);

REV. STAT.

§ 4521 (1946), 46

U.S.C. § 575 (1946); 30 STAT. 755, 764 (1946), 46 U.S.C. § 576 (1946); REv. STAT.
§ 4519 (1946), 46 U.S.C. § 577 (1946); REv. STAT. § 4523 (1946), 46 U.S.C.
§ 578 (1946).
27. 68 F. Supp. 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
28. Laws of the Hanse Towns, Art. XLV. In II LAW AND CUSTOM OF THE SEA
(Mars. ed.) of the British Navy Records Society at p. 52 it is said: "That care shall be
taken for the defraying of the charges of the sick and wounded as aforesaid, and for the
relief of widows, children, and impotent parents ot such as shall be slain in the service
at sea ..
." By statute in England. wages do survive the death of a seaman lost with
his ship. Merchant Shipping Act of 1894, 57 and 58 Vict., Ch. 60, Sec. 174. See, in
general, WILLIAMS AND BRUCE, ADMIRALTY PRACTICE, Ch. IX (3d ed. 1902).
29. See Enochasson v. The Freeport Sulphur, 7 F.2d 674 (S.D. Tex, 1925).
30. Olson v. Whitney, 109 Fed. 80 (D.C. Cal. 1901); The Ben Flint, 3 Fed.
Cas. No. 1299 (D. Wis. 1867); Peterson v. The Chandos, 4 Fed. 645 (D.C. Ore. 1880);
The f. F. Card, 43 Fed. 92 (E.D. Mich. 1890). See also The Bouker No. 2, 241 Fed.
831 (2d Cir. 1917), cert. denied 245 U.S. 647 (1917); The City of Alexandria, 17 Fed.
390 (S.D.N.Y. 1883); The Alector, 263 Fed. 1007 (E.D. Va. 1920).
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application of the remedy. But, with specificity, it is difficult each time to
say what will amount to such an act. For sure, the contracting of venereal
diseases will amount to such misconduct. 81 But injuries received as a result
of intoxication, ' 2 though now largely qualified "recognizing the classic predisposition of sailors ashore," 3 have to be received as a result of such hope-

less and blinding drunkenness before the remedy will not be applied. The
rare finding of this culpable misconduct,34 save the venereal disease cases,
are further testified to be the fact that the ordinary common law defenses
of contributory negligence, the fellow-servant rule, and assumption of risk
cannot stop the mariner from receiving his maintenance and cure.35 Beyond
this we step into an area where utter mysticism prevails, where matters of
degree are largely determinative of result, and where the most reasonable
of men could easily differ.3 0 Thus, where a seaman ashore stepped out to
an unprotected ledge and took hold of an iron rod which he did no more
than superficially examine, it was held that this was not such a gross act
of indiscretion to stop him from receiving the remedy for a broken leg
31. Pierce v. Patton, 19 Fed. Cas. No. 11,145 (E.D. Pa. 1833); Zambrano v.
Moore-McCormack Lines, 131 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1942); The Alector, 263 Fed. 1007
(E.D. Va. 1920); Chandler v. The Annie Buchman, 5 Fed. Cas. No. 2,591a (S.D.N.Y.
1853); Wytheville, 1936 A.M.C. 1281 (E.I). Pa. 1936). But a willful concealment
of a known, but latent, disease at the time of signing on will also defeat recovery.
Tawada v. United States, 1947 A.M.C. 947 (9th Cir. 1947). Cf. Ward v. American
President Lines, 1951 A.M.C. 1585 (N.D. Cal. 1951).
32. Barlow v. Pan Atlantic S.S. Corp.. 101 F.2d 697 (2d Cir. 1939); The Berwinglen, 88 F.2d 125 (1st Cir. 1937); Lortie v, American-Ilawaiian S.S. Lines, 78 F.2d
819 (9th Cir. 1935); Oliver v. Calmar S.S. Corp., 33 F. Supp. 356 (E.D. Pa. 1940);
Adams v. United States, 1940 A.M.C. 9i, (S.DN.Y. 1940).
33. Mr. justice Rutledge in Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co. of N.J., 318 U.S. 724
(1943); see also The Quaker City, I F. Supp. 840 (E.D. Pa. 1931).
34. RoHiNsoN, op. cit. supra note 2 at 294. And see Sullivan v.United States,
179 F.2d 924 (2d Cir. 1949), where a seaman, after having indulged in 18-20 beers,
was not found to have sustained injuries due to his own vice. But see Oliver v. Calmar
S.S. Corp., 33 F. Supp. 356 (E.D. Pa. 1940) where a seaman was denied maintenance
and cure for injuries received after falling when attempting to cross between moving
freight cars, though admittedly tinder the influence of liquor. And the aggressor of a
fistic altercation, and injured thereby, will be denied the remedy because of his own
culpable misconduct. Kable v. United States (No. 2), 175 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1949).
See also Kable v. United States (No. 1), 169 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1948). And see further
Brock v. Standard Oil Co. of N.J., 33 F. Supp. 353 (E.D. Pa. 1940) where a seaman
broke his hand in an altercation after a dispute and was held not to be "in the scope of
employment" and, therefore, not entitled to maintenance and cure because of his own
willful misconduct. The results in the Oliver and Brock cases are now highly dubious.
For discussion of the Kable cases see 3 N.A.C.C.A.L.J. 250 (1949).
35. Earlier law, however, did see the entrance of these detenses to defeat recovery
in cases of the snseaworthiness of the vessel. But this was not the case in the action
for maintenance and cure. The defense of contributory negligence never barred total
recovery as the Admiralty followed the rule of divided damages. The rule was stated as
follows: "By the maritime law the mere negligence of the seaman though that be the
sole cause of the accident makes no difference in his right to be cured at the ship's
expense and to his wages to the end of the voyage." The City of Alexandria, 17 Fed.
390, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 1883). Sec also 38 ILL. L. REv. 193 1944); Reed v. Canfield,
20 Fed. Cas. 426, Fed. Cas. No. 11,641 (Cir. Ct. D. Mass. 1832); Aguilar v. Standard
Oil Co. of N.J., 318 U.S. 724 (1943).
36. See the opinions of Judge Swan in Warren v. United States, 1950 A.M.C. 263
2d Cir. 1950); Justice Frankfurter dissenting in Warren v. United States, 340 U.S. 523
1951), and Justice Douglas for the majority in the same case.
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sustained after he grabbed the iron rod which came off and he fell. But
this result was not free from a dissenting opinion and necessitated a reversal of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.3 But where a seaman returned to the ship intoxicated and assaulted another member of the crew,
during the course of which he sustained personal injuries, he was not allowed to recover his maintenance and cure, his act being one of "willful
misconduct." 3 And where a seaman willfully conceals physical deficiencies
which he does have, this will be termed "culpable misconduct" if his injury
or illness is received as a consequence of this failure to disclose, but will not
be so called if the injury or illness is different than the one that was not
disclosed and willfully concealed. 3 Yet the failure to leave shore for the
ship at an earlier hour than was done was held in the Reed case not to be
a gross act of indiscretion or negligence, though had Canfield returned at
an earlier hour, it is inescapable that lie would never have had to suffer
the removal of his toes. It thus appears that the words "culpable misconduct" or "gross act of indiscretion" are words that can only be applied in a
vacuum, where the words used state only a conclusion and not any method
of logical deduction or reasoning. Such result has not been abated by the
Shipowners' Liability Convention, as proclaimed by the President on September 29, 1939, which in Article 2, Subsections (b) and (c) provides that
national laws may remove the liability of the shipowner for maintenance
and cure in respect of "(b) injury or sickness due to the willful act, default, or misbehavior of the sick, injured or deceased person;" and "(c)
sickness or infirmity intentionally concealed when the engagement isentered into." 40 The Second Article of the Convention has been held to be
self-executing.41
From the opinions in the Reed and Osceola cases it will here be recalled that to receive maintenance and cure the seaman must have been
injured or taken ill when "in the service of the ship." I-low narrowly or
how broadly are we to define the requirement? Let us examine the cases.
The Reed case has already been discussed 4 2 The liberal tradition of the
Admiralty there announced by Mr. Justice Story for its wards was largely
adhered to by later courts until 1931 when severe inroads on the Reed case
were made. Thus, before 1931, it had been held that a seaman, who was
sent ashore to put a line on a spile, and there injured - ashore - could
37. Warren v. United States, 340 U.S. 523 (1951).
38. Condon v. Grace Line, 1951 A.M.C. 489 (N.D. Cal. 1951). See the opinions
in Kable v. United States, 169 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1948) and Kable v. United States,
175 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1949), cnnmented upon in 3 N.A.C.C.A.L.J. 250 (1949). See
further Adams v. United States. 1940 A.M.C. 951 (S.D.N.Y. 1940) though there the fight
occurred ashore.
39. Lipscomb v. Groves, 1951 A.MC. 452 (3d Cir. 1951).
40. Shipowners' Liability Convention, 54 STAT. 1693 (1936), 1938 A.M.C. 1297.
41. Warren v. United States, 340 U.S. 523 (1951).
42. In connection with Reed see Ringgold v. Crocker, 20 Fed. Gas. 813, Fed. Gas.
No. 11,843 (S.D.N.Y. 1848) holding that a seaman will not be denied maintenance
and cure if his injuries were not sustained aboard the ship. The remedy is not limited
to the ship proper.
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recover maintenance and cure though his action in tort for the ship's negligence was dismissed, it not being within admiralty jurisdiction.4 3 However,
by the year 1931, the "inthe service of the ship" requirement began to
plague the courts and then began the process of circumscribing the liberality
with which the requirement had been treated. At least arguably, to find
the means of limitation the courts pounced upon the principles of workmen's compensation legislation. Though maintenance and cure is recoverable if the illness is present, but latent and unknown when articles were
signed, workmen's compensation statutes require that the "accident (arise)
out of and in the course of employment."44 Thus, workmen's conipensation requires causation, i.e., "arise out of the employment." Maintenance
and cure is not so limited as the policy behind it is different. "It is insurance
attaching to a status."'c But armed with this peg of workmen's compensation, application was easy.
In Meyer v. Dollar S.S. Line, 4 a young seaman, Bernard Meyer, who

had signed on for two months, a day before the arrival of the vessel in
Honolulu, engaged in a friendly scuffle on the after port with a few of his
shipmates. He was not on duty but was subject to call. In the course of
this good-natured scuffle, which occurred on November 27, he received a
leg injury. It was necessary that lie leave the ship and enter the Marine
Hospital in Honolulu on November 28. I-Ic had had maintenance and
cure, but was denied wages after November 28. The court had to define
the "in the service of the ship" requirement; it likened it to the "line of
duty" requirement of the Navy and cited for this proposition was the
Naval Courts and Boards, Chapter 12, further saying that by the goodnatured scuffle Meyer created an "extraneous circumstance; he brought
about an intervening cause that directly affected his relation to his employers and to his ship. If the appellant had been sitting on a deck reading
and something accidentally had fallen on his knee, thus causing an injury
similar in type to that which actually occurred, it might be properly held
that the accident had occurred 'in the service of the ship.' But the instant
47
case must be differentiated therefrom.."
Here then was being introduced a concept entirely new and unprecedented, especially where the injury occurred on ship-board and not on
shore or while a seaman was on shore leave. No cases were cited for the
43. The Montezuma, 15 F.2d 580 (S.D.N.Y. 1926).
44. As an example of this requirement in workmen's compensation schemes see
Part 1 of MCKIINNEY's CoNsouorAo LAWs OF NEw YoRK, AsNo.,
VORKMEN'S
CoMrENSATION LAW, Part 1, Art. 1, § 2(7). See also Sims v. United States, 1950 A.M.C.
714 (N.D. Cal. 1949) where the words "in the course of his employment" also crept
into the decision.
45. 38 ILL. L. Rev. 193, 199.
46. 49 F.2d 1002 (9th Cir. 1931). See also Brock v. Standard Oil Co. of N.J.,
33 F. Supp. 353 (E.D. Pa. 1940); Jackson v. Pittsburg S.S. Co., 131 F.2d 668 (6th
Cir. 1940); and \Valgreen v. Standard Oil Co. of N.J., 42 F. Supp. 992 (S.D.N.Y.
1941), where a seaman engaged upon his own personal affairs, and there injured, could
recover maintenance and cure.
47. 49 F.2d 1002, 1003 (1931).
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"intervening cause doctrine." One could well wonder at the direct applicability of the techniques of Naval Courts when the vessel upon which
Meyer sailed was privately owned and not at all subject to the jurisdiction
of the Navy. Furthermore, it is interesting to note, and question, why
seaman Meyer was given his wages until November 28 (when he was
placed ashore in Honolulu) and not up to when he was injured, and incapacitated, which day was on November 27. Certainly, on that basis, he
was no more "in the service of the ship" than when he was in the Honolulu
hospital - indeed, he was probably a burden to the "service of the ship"
that one day. But the court supplied us with no answer. One could well
wonder if Meyer, incapacitated and injured, had to remain a month aboard
the vessel as to the result the court would have reached.
In the President Coolidge case,48 the claimant was injured while going
ashore to answer an expected long distance telephone call from his wife.
To do so he dropped his task, but had not left the ship. Maintenance and
cure was denied on the intervening cause doctrine as his injury was not
received while engaged in his employment, i.e., "in the line of duty" as
being tantamount to "in the service of the ship."
But the "new doctrine" began to find new allies and new champions.
Among such was the Southern District Court of New York in Collins v.
Dollar S.S. Lines.4" In the Collins case, seaman Collins signed aboard on
July 29, 1936, for a voyage around the world and return to San Francisco
in the capacity of a fireman. In September of the same year, while the
ship was in Singapore, Collins was given shore leave and, with others,
proceeded to a park to engage in a game of baseball for amusement. While
so engaged he sustained serious and permanent personal injuries. He was
compelled to leave the ship. He sought to recover maintenance and cure.
This was denied. Relied on was, of course, the Meyer case from which the
Collins opinion liberally quoted to the effect that a seaman will be responsible
. . . for an intervening cause if (1) it consisted in his own willful
misconduct, or (2) it was something which he is doing in pursuance of some private avocation or business, or (3) it is something which grows out of relations unconnected with the service
or is not the logical incident of provable effect of duty in the
service. Therefore, being on shore leave, Collins was doing something unconnected with his service and not a logical incident of
duty in the ship's service. For the time being the libellant was
entirely free from control or the supervision
entirely on his own, 50
of the ship's officers.
It is here interesting to note that in 1937-one year before-the

Southern District Court of New York, in a brief memorandum opinion,
awarded a seaman maintenance and cure for an injury received on shore
48.
49.
50.
51.

23 F. Supp. 575 (N.D. Wash. 1938).
23 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1938).
Id. at p. 397.
1938 A.M.C. 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1937).
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while he was approaching his vessel to go on watch. But the Hogan case was
not even cited in Collins.
To show the extraordinary limits to which a precedent, once begun,
can go, in 1941 there appeared upon the scene the case of Smith v. American South African Line, Inc.,5 2 in which case the claimant, Smith, a
member of the crew, was given shore leave when the vessel was in an
African port. In returning to the vessel, on a public street, but at a distance of two miles away from the ship, Smith was struck by a motorcycle
and severely injured. The court held that Smith could not recover maintenance and cure as he was not engagedl "in the service of the ship" while on
shore leave. The defendant contended that Smith could not recover wages
if there was no valid claim for maintenance and cure. The court agreed

citing Meyer, President Coolidge, and Collins over the contention of Smith
that wages is a different matter and have their origin in the ship's articles.5 3
At this point we can interject the question, which naturally follows
from the results of Meyer, Collins, President Coolidge, and Smith, though
no cases came up after those decisions, as to when does shore leave begin
and end if no maintenance and cure is to be awarded if the injuries are
sustained during shore leave. Surprisingly, the cases are few in number in
view of the very vexatious question. In The Scotland case,M a seaman coining aboard to join the crew was injured when he fell off the ladder. In
The Michael Tracy,r5 a seaman who had been discharged at the end of
the voyage and paid fell off a ladder when leaving the ship. In both cases
maintenance and cure was awarded.-" The results are consonant with the
liberal spirit of the admiralty tradition. XWith the Meyer history one could
only speculate as to whether the results would have been the same or., were
the cases presented, whether a process of erosion would have been under
way on The Scotland and The Michael Tracy.
But the paralysis upon admiralty thinking, as begun in Meyer, bcgan
to press upon the door of the United States Suprenie Court. Practically
total ignorancc of the Reed case was displayed in the entire Meyer history.
To which of the two would the Supreme Court adhere?
.The opportunity came in the case of Aglilar v. Standard Oil Co. of
N.J., 7 where the Supreme Court reconsidered its previous denial of certiorari5 8 and granted it because of the conflict of Circuits between Agilar5 '
and the decision of the Third Circuit 'Court of Appeals in David Jones v.
52. 37 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
53. For other cases in the Meyer line see note 45, sora, and the cases denying maintenance and cure where the injury occurred on property over which the shipowner had
no control, Todahl v. Sudden and Christensen, 5 F.2d 462 (9th Cir. 1925) and Lilly v.
U.S. Lines, 42 F. Stipp. 214 (S.D.N.Y. 1941 ).
54. 42 Fed. 925 (S.D.N.Y. 1890).
55. 295 Fed. 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
56. 38 ILL. L. REV. 193 (1944).
57. 318 U.S. 724 (1943).
58. 317 U.S. 622 (1942).
59. 130 F.2d 154 (2d Cir. 1942).
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Waterman S.S. Corp. In Aguilar, the seaman was struck by a motor vehicle while walking over the premises of a subsidiary of Standard Oil (his
employer), through which it was necessary for him to pass in returning
to his ship from shore leave. He sued for maintenance and cure; the Supreme
Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Rutledge, in reversing the Second
Circuit in Aguilar while affirming the result of the Third Circuit in the
Jones case, awarded it to him and, in so doing, overturned the Meyer line.
Hence, a seaman on shore leave, and there being injured, was still to be
considered "in the service of the ship." Oddly enough, the Court placed
very little reliance on the Hogan case, citing that case once and that only
in an immaterial aspect. Yet the Hogan case is indistinguishable from the
facts in Aguilar. On analogy from the cases involving worklnen's compen-

sation the same result could have been reached, for if the employee is
injured on a street, not public, constituting a means of access to the place
of employment, many states have not denied compensation.' But the Court
did not feel itself constrained to principles of workmen's compensation
and stated a far broader doctrine based on the historical growth of the
remedy and held that seamen were entitled to the same protection while
on shore leave as well as on the ship, on the ground that it was the ship's
business which subjected the seaman to the risks of relaxation instrange
surroundings, Mr. Justice Rutledge saying that
In short, shore leave is an elemental necessity in the sailing
of ships, a part of the business as old as the art, not merely a personal diversion . ..The shipowner owes the protection regardless

of whether he is at fault; the seaman's fault, unless gross, can not
defeat it; unlike the statutory liability of employers on land. It is
not limited to strictly occupational hazards or to injuries which
have an immediate causal connection with an act of labor, '
Thus, the broad doctrine of Aguilar is that the seaman's being on shore
leave does not mean that he is not "in the service of the ship." Yet it is
to be remembered that the Aguilar result, in the specific application of its
facts, though no doubt intending and stating a far broader doctrine, held only
that the remedy will be applied when the seaman is leaving the ship to go
on shore leave or is returning to the ship from it; that is, on the premises
or the immediate shore area surrounding the vessel. \Vhether the principle
would go further was left for many recent decisions.A
60. 130 F.2d 797 (3d Cir. 3942).
61. Texas is such a state. Lumberman's Recip. Ass'n v. Bchunken, 11 Tes. 103,
46 S.W. 72 (1922). See note 22 Tx. L. Rv. 239, 240.
62. 318 U.S. 724, 734 (1943).
63. In Sicilano v. United States, 56 F. Stipp, 442 (S.D,N.Y. 1944), the court
limited Aguilar to injuries suffered on or near the dock area. In the case the seaman
was assaulted, but as the locality of the attack was not identified and as it may have
been remote from the ship, the owner was not held liable for maintenance and cure. To
the same effect limiting Aguilar to its facts are Taylor v. United Fruit Co., 71 N.Y.S.2d
22 (1st Dep't 1947) and Smith v. United States, 1947 A.MC, 481 (E.D. Va. 1946),
the latter case being reversed in 167 F.2d 550 (4th Cir. 1948). But these cases can no
longer be regarded as controlling as seamen have been held to be "in the service of the
ship" while ashore and injured in bar-room brawls, Nowery v. Smith, 161 F.2d 732
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In Gaynor v. United States,64 the libellant, Gaynor, when his ship was
in the port of Charleston, South Carolina, was granted shore leave which
was to expire two days later. He spent the night in Charleston and on the
following afternoon took a bus out of Charleston, intending to spend the
night with his brother-in-law who lived fifty miles away. When the bus
was about thirty-five miles out of Charleston there was a collision and
Gaynor suffered a fracture of his right leg. It was held that Gaynor could
recover his maintenance and cure, the court reading Aguilar as not limiting
the remedy to the fortuitous chance of the locus of the accident, but granting the remedy to the seaman on shore leave "wherever he may be."
Were there any doubt as to the result in Gaynor, it was certainly resolved by the United States Supreme Court in the very recent decision in
Warren v. United States." In the Warren case, the seaman went ashore in
Naples, Italy; did some sightseeing and drinking, whereupon he went to a
dance hall. A room adjoining the dance-hall overlooked the ocean but also
had an unprotected ledge. He went onto this ledge, grabbed an iron rod
after a very superficial examination, and leaned over. The rod snapped off
and Warren fell to a ledge below, thereby sustaining a broken leg. The
Supreme Court in deciding the case split three ways with Mr. Justice Douglas writing the majority opinion and holding that Warren was "in the
service of the ship," reading Aguilar as applying to injuries received during
the actual shore relaxation as it does to injuries received while going to or
returning from that shore relaxation. But justices Jackson and Clark dissented, feeling that Warren was not "in the service of the ship." Their
reading of Aguilar was narrower, that is to say applying that case so far as
the facts dictated. Hence, they reasoned, the choice of a place of relaxation
(3d Cir. 1947); Moss v. Alaska Packers Ass'n, 1945 A.M.C. 493, 160 P.2d 224 (Cal.

App. 1945); in public street brawls, Stanley v. Weyerhauser S.S. Co., 1947 A.M.C. 411

(Super. Ct. Cal. 1947) (at a distance of seventeen miles from the ship); Grovell v.
Stockard S.S. Co., 78 F. Supp. 931 (E.D. Pa. 1948) (assault by Italian hackie in
Italian port while on shore leave-thus showing that if the injury occurs in a foreign
port that is no basis of limiting the application of the remedy); and at places some
distance from the vessel, Ellis v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 165 F.2d 999 (9th Cir.
1948) (seaman injured while on shore leave by diving into a swimming pool); Smith v.
United States, 167 F.2d 550 (4th Cir. 1948) (where the seaman was given leave to
return to his home for some personals. He went to his home and then to a friend's
house where he spent the night. The next day he left to return to the ship--a distance
of seven miles. While so leaving, he turned his ankle in the driveway of his friend's
house); Petersen v. Marine Trans. Lines, Inc., 1948 A.M.C. 544 (Super. Ct. Cal. 1948);
and Dasher v. United States, 59 F. Supp. 742 (S.D.N.Y. 1945). The most interesting
of all these cases is Petersen v. Marine Trans. Lines, Inc., where a seaman, having just
joined a vessel in the Philippine Islands, was a short time later given shore leave. On
the same evening he was assaulted ashore. Exactly at what point away from the vessel
he was the report does not disclose for want of knowledge. He then returned to the
vessel, worked six days, but then had to be hospitalized. It was held that he was "in
the service of the ship" under Aguilar. Thus, when joining a vessel and not doing a
moment's work aboard the ship, then being injured while on valid shore leave, though
being a member of the crew, would see one "in the service of the ship." Though the
result is consonant with Aguilar, it goes far beyond what was probably intended early
as the meaning of the "in the service of the ship" requirement.
64. 90 F. Supp. 114 (E.D. Pa. 1950).
65. 340 U.S. 523 (1951).
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was the sailor's own. If there injured the sailor could not avail himself of
the fruit of the remedy. Mr. Justice Frankfurter also dissented, but in an
aspect of the case here immaterial.
So with the return to the humanitarian spirit of the Admiralty neither
is the nature of the seaman's pursuit while on shore leave to be regarded
as a deterrent to the application of the remedy. Thus, in Koinstinen v. American Export Lines,6 a seaman, in Yugoslavia, after imbibing a few drinks,
was lured to a prostitute's room, and upon consummating his activities
there, he refused to pay her what she felt to be her just deserts. In consequence, she locked him in her room. A man then appeared and in the
choice of either the man or a nearby window as a means of egress, he chose
the latter, from which fall he sustained injuries requiring hospitalization,
but for all of which he was not denied his maintenance and cure. However,
if the seaman is injured ashore, and inconsequential of the nature of his
activities, without having obtained authorized shore leave67 or having actually deserted the ship,68 he is not considered to be "in the service of the
ship," and, therefore, cannot recover maintenance and cure. But the case
of where the seaman overstays valid shore leave, at least for two hours,
brings us to the threshold of the fact situation in the Farrell case, but which
case would see the overstaying of leave as no bar to the recovery of maintenance and cure. Thus we have the conclusion that one on a totally unauthorized shore leave can not recover for injuries sustained while on shore
leave whereas one leaving on authorized shore leave, but overstaying that
leave for two hours, can recover.
The seaman becoming ill or injured in the service of the ship is under
a duty to accept care and treatment in the marine hospital inasmuch as
these hospitals are maintained by the Government for the benefit of seamen. If the seaman refuses the marine hospital care he can not then turn
about and sue the shipowner for his expenses incurred in his maintenance
and cure.6 9 The duty of the ship is discharged by tendering to the injured
seaman a certificate of entry into either a marine hospital or any other
hospital." If the seaman voluntarily leaves the hospital not against the
advice of the attending physician the recovery will not be denied. 1 But
unreasonable leaving of the hospital may see the seaman recover no mainte66. 83 N.Y.S.2d 287 (N.Y.City Ct.
67. Klass Schuitema vs. Polarus S.S.
1947). See also the dictum in Aguilar,
United States, 63 F. Supp. II (S.D.N.Y.
68. Spengers v. United States, 1932

1948).
Co., 1947 A.M.C. 1629 (Mun. Ct. of N.Y.City
supra note 35. See further and cf. Leahy v.
1945).
A.M.C. 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1931).
69. AXTELL, MERCHANT Sr.MEn's LAw 58 (1945). See also Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 46 (1948); Robinson v. Swayne and Hoyt, 33 F. Supp. 93 (S.D. Cal.
1940); and Hoff v. United States, 1950 A.M.C. 591 (W.D. Wash. 1949).
70. The Bouker No. 2, 241 Fed. 831 (2d Cir. 1917), cert. denied 245 U.S. 647
(1917); The William Nelson, 33 F.2d 539 (\V.D.N.Y. 1929). See note 71 of RonImsoN,
op. cit. supra note 2 at p. 295.
71. Rey v, Colonial Nay. Co., 116 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1941).
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nance and cure."' Nor can seamen who do not avail themselves of the
facilities of an available hospital recover medical expenses incurred by them
outside the hospital unless they would not have been confined to the hospital had they gone there.13 However, in Brionkman '. Oil Transfer Corp.,7 4
an infant-seaman who was working on the defendant's tug and tow through
the New York Barge Canal, and who in that capacity was injured, but
whose maintenance and cure had been furnished by his parents, the latter
having made payments without any express agreement providing for reimbursement, was not denied recovery. The court distinguished the above
fact situations in that there the seaman deliberately refused a designated
hospital whcrcas here the owner did not even suggest a hospital and the
seaman, in good faith, went elsewhere. The distinction, it is submitted, is
sound, though there is no authority for it as made elsewhere.
We are now brought to the second of the requirements announced
by Mr. Justice Brown in The Osceola. This requirement was that the owner
would bc liable for wages and maintenance and cure "at least so long as
the voyage is continued." The apparent difficulty with this statement is
5
that it does not say when wages and/or maintenance and cure cease. '
Treating the words literally it can be said that the right to wages extends
not beyond the end of the voyage,' 1 Thus, in McManus v. Marine TransPort Lines, 7 the libellant sustained a scratch which was later found to lead
to an ulcerous condition of the shin which would require medical treatment.
It was held that all award of wages after tile end of the voyage, and in
addition to maintenance and cure, could not be supported. However, it is
here well to observe that in the MIeyer case the wages were not allowed to
the end of the voyage, and wcre not given in accordance with the articles
which the seaman signed, but this was so bccause Meyer was not "in the
service of the ship" 78 and, therefore, a condition was read into the contract
that if the scaman did not work thcn he could not be paid his wages. No
doubt there is that as to wages this was never intended to be the law. The
Osceola statemcnt says that the wages arc to be given until the cnd of the
72. The Santa Barbara. 263 Fed. 369 (2d Cit. 1920); Baker v. Waterman S.S.

Corp., 103 F.2d 987 (5th Cir. 1939).
73. t.nima Marie, 193 A.M.C, 432 (D.C, Mass. 1932).
74. 1950 AM,.C. 341 (N.Y. Ct. of Appeals 1949).

75. See the language of ludge Hough in The Bouker No. 2, 241 Fed. 831, 833 (2d
Cir. 1917), cert. denied 245 U.S. 647 (1917), where he could find "neither controlling

authority nor complete consensus of opinion as to the point left open in The Osceola,
nor has our attention been directed to any decision dealing with the cost or reasonable
expense of attempted cure."

76. The William Penn, 1925 A.MC. 1316 (E.1).N.Y. 1925). Other cases holding
that wages are to be given to the cnd of the voyage are Ward v. American President
Lines, 1951 A.M.C. 1585 (N.D. Cal. 1951); Ziegler v. Marine Transport Lines, 78 F.
Supp. 216 (ED. Pa. 1947); Jones v. Watcnnan S.S. Corp. 155 F.2d 992 (3d Cir. 1946);
and The Betsy Ross, 145 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1944).
77. 149 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1945).

See also Great Lakes S.S. Co. v. Geiger, 261

Fed. 275 (6th Cir. 1931).
78. But see 'llce William Penn, supra note 75. See also O'Byrne v. United States,
1925 A.M.C. 943 (S.D.N.Y. 1925).
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voyage. Thus, on analogical principles a few earlier cases held that maintenance and cure could then only last until the voyage was terminated."
However, this rule of some of the earlier cases has been abandoned and
it is now fairly settled law that the expenses of maintenance and cure last, at
least, until a reasonable time after the end of the voyage, that reasonable
time depending upon the facts and injury or illness involved.
Mr. Justice Story in the course of his decision in the Harden case had
cause to utter the following language:
The award of a lump sum in anticipation of the continuing
need of maintenance and cure for life or an indefinite period, is
without support in judicial decision. Awards of small amounts
to cover future maintenance and cure of a kind and for a period
definitely ascertained or ascertainable have occasionally been made.
.. . The duty does not extend beyond the seaman's need ...
Furthermore, a duty imposed to safeguard the seaman from the
danger of illness without succor, and to safeguard him, in case of
illness, against the consequences of his own improvidence, would
hardly be performed by the payment of a lump sum to cover the
cost of medical attendance during life.
Thus,
The seaman's recovery must therefore be measured in each case
by the reasonable cost of that maintenance and cure to which he
is entitled at time of trial, including, in the discretion of the court,
such amounts as may be needful in the immediate future for the
maintenance and cure of a kind and for a period which can be
definitely ascertained."'
Ushered in now is the problem of the length of time for which the
owner is liable for the seaman's maintenance and cure. That cure has been
defined as follows:
The word cure (from the Latin, cura) is used, however, in

its original meaning of care and means of proper care, not positive
cure which may be impossible. The duty, which must have arisen
before termination of the voyage and wage relation continues thereafter for a reasonable
time determinable in each case by reference
12
to the facts.
With so broad a definition perception will dictate thatapplication to
79. The Atlantic, 1 Abb. Adm. 451 (1849); The Ben FHint, 3 Fed. Cas. No. 1299
(Dist. Ct. D. Visc. 1867); and The f. F. Card, 43 Fed. 92 (E.D. Nich. 1890).
80. This was the original doctrine announced by Mr. Justice Story in Reed v. Canfield. It was followed in The Bouker No. 2 supra note 74; Saunders v. Luckenbach S.S.
Corp., 62 Fed. 845 (S.D.N.Y. 1919); Ile Eastern Dawn, 25 F.2d 322 (E.D. Pa. 1928k;
The Ipswich, 46 F.2d 136 (D.C. Md. 1930); Triantafilos v. United States, 1950 AM..
96 (3d Cir. 1950). Contra: The Tammerlane, 47 Fed. 822 (N.D. Cal. 1891) and The
City of Alexandria, 17 Fed. 390 (S.D.N.Y. 1383). See also 1 BEN-EDICT, op. cit. supra
p. 254, n. 31.
81. See also Fitz-lenry Smith, Jr., Liability in the Admiralty For Injuries to Seamen,

19 HARv. L. Rev. 418, at p. 419, in which lie says that "Some Courts . . . have held that
the liability of the ship is completed 'at least so far as ordinary medical care extend.' "
See cases cited in note on p. 419. The quote within the quote is from Reed v. Canfield.
82. BEN'EDICr, op. cit. supra, pp. 253-254. See also, The Mars, 149 Fed. 729 (3d
Cir. 1907); and Wilson v. Manhattan Can. Co., 205 Fed. 996 (W.D. Wash. 1913).
And see further RoaixsoN, o. cit. supra, at pp. 298-300.
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specific facts is not free from difficulty. Where the illness is incurable the
duty to afford maintenance and cure has been held not to extend beyond a
fair time after the voyage has ended, in short until the seaman has been
given the maximum possible medical cure-which is to be distinguished
from an absolute cure. Cases to such effect are many. 3 So, in the case of
illness incurred in the service of the ship, the award of a lump sum recognizing a need for maintenance and cure for either an indefinite period, or
for life, has not been supported by the cases on the problem. Thus, in
Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor,"4 Taylor, while in the employ of the Cahnar
Lines, following an injury to his foot, was found to be afflicted with an
incurable illness called Buerger's disease, but which disease was found not
to be caused by the injury. Though amputation of the affected parts could
halt the advance of the disease, medical opinion was to the effect that the
disease was progressive and would ultimately cause death. Taylor suffered
four amputations and was paid small sums of maintenance and cure. He
then sued in Admiralty, as the illness was incurable, for a lump sum award
based on his life expectance. As the disease was progressive requiring care
to arrest its progress, the Third Circuit Court of Appealss ' awarded Taylor
a lifelong maintenance and cure to be given in one lump sum. But this was
undone by the United States Supreme Court in an opinion by Mr. Justice
Stone. In answering the two questions presented by the review, Mr. Justice
Stone issued forth the following dictum, presciently if not prophetically:
In answering the first we lay to one side those cases where the
incapacity is caused by the employment. As to them considerations
not present here may apply, which might be thought to require a
more liberal application of the rule than we think is called for in
this case.80 (Italics supplied.)
And then continued on to say:
But we find no support in the . . . doctrine for holding that it
imposes on the shipowner an indefinitely continuing obligation to
furnish medical care to a seaman afflicted with an incurable disease
which manifests itself, during the employment, but is not caused
by it. - . . We can find no basis for saying that, if the disease proves
to be incurable, the duty extends beyond a fair time after the voyage
83. Lindquist v. Dilkes, 127 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1942) (urinary trouble); Interocean
S.S. Co. v. Behrenden, 128 F.2d 506 (6th Cir. 1942) (intestinal trouble); and Loverich
v. Warner, 118 F.2d 690 (3d Cir. 1941) (cancer). See also Muruaga v. United States,
172 F.2d 318 (2d Cir. 1949) and Robinson v. United States, 177 F.2d 582 (5th Cir.
1949). See further the following: The Josephine and Mary, 120 F.2d 459 (1st Cir.
(1941); Lindgren v. Shepard S.S. Co., 168 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940); Skolar v. Lehigh
Valley, 60 F.2d 893 (2d Cir. 1932); Kiksich v. Misetich, 140 F.2d 812 (9th Cir. 1944);
Montilla v. United States, 70 F. Supp. 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1946); and Lynskey v. Great
Lakies Transit Corp., 42 F. Supp. 816 (S.D.N.Y. 1942). To the same effect is the
Shipowners' Liability Convention of 1936, 54 STAT. 1693 (1936) of which Article IV
says that "The shipowner shall be liable to defray the expenses of medical care and
maintenance until the sick or injured person has been cured, or until the sickness or
incapacity has been declared of a permanent character." This Convention became effective on October 29, 1939.
84. 303 U.S. 525 (1938), noted in 24 VA. L. REv. 920 (1938).
85. 92 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1937).
86. 303 U.S. 525, 530 (i1938).
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in which to effect such improvement in the seaman's condition may
be expected to result from nursing, care, and medical treatment.8t
And, secondly, as to the lump sum award refused its award on the
basis of the above quotations from the pen of Mr. Justice Story in the
Harden case.
But be Calmar as it may, the denial of a lifelong maintenance and cure
would not prevent the bringing of a later suit for any further expenses
incurred in obtaining relief of a curative nature.88 At that time, the owner
would be precluded from asserting the defense of splitting the claim.8 9 However, if the owner denies owing maintenance and cure at that time, or even
in the initial action, the court will not order the money to be paid while
90
the cause is pending.
With the above reservation of opinion by Mr. Justice Stone in Calmar,
we are brought again to Farrell. In short, in Farrell the injury was caused
by the employment while Farrell was in the service of the ship; in Calmar,
the illness arose during the employment, but its cause was wholly unrelated
to the employment save its appearance therein. The facts and holding of
Farrell have already been presented with the inception of this writing.
Before discussing the reservation of Mr. Justice Stone in Calmar other
matter is initially compelling.
Discussion has already been made of the shore leave line of cases and
its culmination in Aguilar, Gaynor, and Warren. Cases have been cited to
show that a seaman injured while upon an unauthorized shore leave can
not recover maintenance and cure." Some brief reference was made to the
fact that in Farrell the seaman was on authorized shore leave, but was two
hours overleave. This fact alone did not militate against his recovery, though
to say that he was "in the service of the ship" when overleave, does somewhat strain Aguilar though not convincingly so when he was still "subject
to the call of the ship."92 But then, are not seamen on unauthorized shore
leave still "subject to the call of the ship?" The phrase is very difficult of
precise definition and application. But Mr. Justice Jackson for the majority
in Farrell said that
le must, of course, at the time be in the service of the ship,
by which is meant that he must be generally answerable to its call
to duty rather than actually in performance of routine tasks or
specific orders?
Now can this be taken to say that the result would have been the
hours? Could it possibly have made any difference inasmuch as Farrell was
returning overleave to the ship when the catastrophic fall occurred? What
87. Ibid.
88. Farrell v. United States, 336 U.S. 511 (1949).
89. Cervo v. lsbrandtsen Co., Inc., 178 F.Zd 919 (2d Cir. 1949).
90. Jakobsen v. Pan American Co., 1950 A.M.C. 554 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
91. See note 66 supra.
92. Cf. 23 So. CALIF. L. REv. 81 (1949), which says that "Literally, a seaman
is not subject to call when he is absent overleave, or when returning therefrom overleave."
93. 336 U.S. 511, at pp. 515-516. With this language it is difficult to comprehend
Mr. Justice Jackson's dissenting opinion in Warren v. United States, 340 U.S. 523 (1951).
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if he was not? In line with the above quotation from the opinion of the
majority, which embraces a seaman who is returning overleave to his ship,
then does it not also embrace a seaman who is returning to his ship having
left it on an unauthorized shore leave? The time overleave, for sure, is
the same as an unauthorized leave period. But to the question, Farrell
supplies us utterly not with answer. Arguably, the nature of Farrell's injuries
may have prevailed upon the court to extend Aguilar this far. But what
limitations are there upon this extension? To be logical, to hold the owner
liable for maintenance and cure if the seaman is injured while he is overleave, would necessitate holding him whenever the seaman returns and
however late. Then what is left of the duty of seamen not to overstay their
leaves? As a matter of discipline, what, if any, would be a substantial
enough breach thereof? Questions can only be raised aloft with the very
precarious extension which the entire court did make in Farrell.
Historically speaking, the only ancient sea code which expressly provides
for a lifelong maintenance and cure is Article XXXV of the Laws of the
Hanse Towns, quoted in the first part of this writing, and which provision
the majority in Farrell attempted to distinguish, or rather to show its
disuse to the world of 1914. This Article principally provides that ". . . If
any one of them is maimed and disabled he shall be maintained as long as
he lives by a like average." (Italics supplied.) A literal reading of this
sentence could have seen Farrell reach the opposite result that it did, though
it would be inapposite for purposes of Calmar,at least arguably so. In short,
the provision is aimed at injured seamen who have been cursed with an
incurable illness. But Mr. Justice Jackson, as spokesman for the five man
majority, felt the provision inapplicable as it was written when pirates were
real dangers and the seaman would be called upon at a moment's notice to
ward them off to save the ship and cargo. In the Farrell case no such fact
situation was present. Though there were no pirates, the vessel was the
legitimate target for enemy craft; however, at the time of the injury, no
enemy attack was in progress. Then Mr. Justice Jackson continued by
saying that
Even if we pass all this and assume the ship always to have
been in potential danger and in need of defense, this seaman at the
time of his injury had taken leave of her and he is in no position to
claim that be was a sacrifice to her salvation. Far from helping to
man the ship at the moment, he was unable to find her . . . we
can find no rational basis for awarding lifetime maintenance against
the ship on the theory that he was wounded or maimed while
defending her against enemies."4
It appears that the majority limits the word "fighting" to actual combat,
perhaps an unnecessary limitation in view of the fact that Farrell was a
member of the "fighting armed forces." Though there were no pirates (for
which the Article read) with the changes of time so does the Article adopt
94. 336 U.S. 511, 514-515 (1948).
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a new meaning to fit the change. Though the Bodaglio Armistice was signed
in September, 1943, still Italy was not in toto Allied. By February 5, 1944,
the Southern parts of Italy, particularly Sicily, were subject to heavy aerial
bombardment and in Palermo strict conditions of blackout had to be
observed. Thus, there was a constant state of danger in which the seaman
would have to stand by the ship to save her. However, the majority is
willing to concede this much. But even, they claim, going this far, there
is no basis to award the recovery as Farrell, at the time of his injury, was on
shore leave and in no position to claim that he was a sacrifice to the salvation of the vessel. Yet the majority then extends the principle of the
shore leave cases to hold Farrell 'inthe service of the ship." Thus, that
Farrell was -iithe service of the ship" and in constant state of danger
seem to be admissions of no force. But to avoid awarding recovery because
Farrell was on shore leave and then to admit that he was "in the service
of the ship" seems an alien principle if not amounting to inconsistency. In
giving so literal a construction to the Article they are writing it off the
books-overlooking, for whatever its value, the principle of liberal application of the old sea codes.
Secondly, as to the reservation of opinion made by Mr. Justice Stone
in the Calmar case where the 'incapacity is caused by the employment,"
there was no compulsion on the court to say that a different rule must
apply. But the majority in Farrell felt that a different measure of maintenance could not be applied saying:
We think no such distinction exists or was premised in the
Calmar case. .

.

.For any purpose to introduce a graduation of

rights and duties based on some relative proximity of the activity
at the time of injury to the 'employment' or 'service of the ship'
would alter the basis and be out of harmony with the spirit and
function of the doctrine and would open the door to the litigousness which has made the landsman's remedy so often a promise to
the ear to be broken to the hope.95
But obviously, such a distinction was the premise upon which Mr.
Justice Stone answered Calmar as he did. There an illness not caused by
the employment could not see Taylor the beneficiary of a lifelong mailtenance and cure. In Farrell, the injury was caused by and during the
service or employment. The effect of the majority argument is to overrule
the reservation made by Mr. Justice Stone in Calmar. Yet the Court's
majority made no express declaration of overruling this reservation of
opinion.
Thirdly, indenying Farrell's claim, Mr. Justice Jackson came forth with
the following interesting language:
If we should concede that large measure of maintenance is due
those whose injury is caused by the employment, it would seem
farfetched to hold it applicable here. Claimant was disobedient
to his orders and for his personal purposes overstayed his shore
95. Id. at pp. 515-516.
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leave. His fall into a drydock . .. was due to no negligence but
his own."
By this admision, however, Mr. Justice Jackson is resurrecting the
reservation of opinion made in Calmar (which in the preceding paragraph
of the opinion he had 'enervated'), and saying that a lifelong award of
maintenance may be awarded, but in a case where the injury is not contributorily caused by the overleave and "negligence" of the injured mariner.
Thus, an original question would be presented if the injury was "caused by
the employment" and was in no way caused by the seaman's disobedienco
and 'negligence." Such an aggregation of facts would present a question
which Farrell does not necessarily answer.
But so far as Farrell itself is concerned, it is to be here recalled that in
the first part of this writing we concluded that only the gross negligence
of the seaman would defeat his right to the remedy. Thus, if the remedy
were given for a lifetime, it would only be the same gross negligence of
the seaman that would shut off the remedy. It was conceded by the
majority that Farrell's negligence was not a gross act of indiscretion, especially when he was held to be "in the service of the ship." To stop the
graduation of the remedy should likewise only require tile same degree of
negligence. Mere negligence is not enough.
Fourthly, as Farrell's case was one of permanent disabilities, which had
reached a point of maximum possible cure, but which would require future
medical aid extending throughout the seaman's life, it is to be distinguished
from the case where there is a permanent disability, but one which does
Dot require any future medical assistance. 7 Thus, as Farrell would require
future medical succor, the majority did say that when he received care of a
curative nature, he could recover in a new proceeding the amount spent
for the maintenance and cure. The difficulty with this assertion is that it
encourages the litigousness which the Court is endeavoring to keep at an
utter modicum. Surely the burden could be an exacting one on both the
shipowner and the shipowned to be subjected to such a mechanical process,
let alone the very crowded dockets of the courts. Thus, as a matter of
convenience, there is some basis for a lump sum award. Its evaluation is
no light matter as the amount is highly speculative and completely in futuro.
It is impossible to use analogies of tort and contract damages assessment
as the recovery is not based on either tort or contract. To predicate such
an award it should be the present value of the maintenance and cure
during the remainder of the seaman's life, with use of mortality tables. It
is, therefore, also necessary to conjecture, from the nature of the injuries,
whether with medical care the disability will diminish in the frequency of
its manifestations, and how much so. Though this is necessarily approxi96. Id. at pp. 516-517.
97. See Gaynor v. United States, 90 F. Supp. 751 (E.D. Pa. 1950), Cf. Muruaga
v. United States, 172 F.2d 318 (2d Cir. 1949); and Robinson v. United States, 177
F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1949).

FARRELL V. UNITED STATES

mation the seaman should have the election, being precluded from asserting
the deficiency should the lump sum be insufficient. If such a result is to
be viewed as too broad and dangerous a precedent, then its application
should only be where the mariner's case is an extreme one such as Farrell.
The obvious difficulty is that this is judicial legislation, but the courts of
necessity have frequently indulged therein. Whether such rationality would
apply to cases of illness or injury caused by the employment, but arising
after departure from the employment, is an unanswered question which
Farrell does not answer. However, the argument of Mr. Justice Story in the
Harden ease, and repeated by Mr. Justice Stone in the Calmar case, against
the awarding of a lunp sum to a class admitted to be improvident, to
protect them from the wiles of their own caprice, can only be viewed as
misleading when one's limbs have been amputated (Cdlnmar) or when one
is blind and subject to paroxysms (Farrell). To avoid this the most nearly
perfect suggestion would be for the imposition of a trust; but the Admiralty,
with all its ability to do "Equity,"I8 is powerless over trusts, to create or
impose one?" Tile most liberal policy of paternalism has not carried the
Admiralty this far. A far-fetched solution, to protect against improvidence
or "confidence men" urging investment of the fund, would be the creation
of an agency, similar to a workmen's compensation commission, into which
the employer would contribute the lump sum, and which the agency would
administer for the mariner's needs, allowing any excess, if so there be, to be
distributed among his heirs at death.
Procedurally and otherwise, the seaman has three rights under which
he can recover for his injuries or illness. Hc may (1) sue for negligence
under the Jones Act, (2) sue under the general maritime law for disabilities
due to "unseaworthiness" of the vessel, and (3) sue for maintenance and
cure. Older authority said that between (1) and (2) above the seaman
must elect,100 but the more recent authority says that the seaman can sue
for both (1) and (2)101 above so long as he elects either a suit in Admiralty
or at common law with a jury. But the third right, that of maintenance
and cure, the seaman has apart from whatever other claim he may have for
damages.102' "There is a difference of opinion as to whether the scaman
should recover his maintenance and cure in the same action which disposes
of the negligence or unseaworthiness allegations, or whether he may or
should maintain two actions or take two verdicts.""' There were, at least
tip to 1939, cases in which the courts required two actions to be brought.10 4
98. See I BENEDICT, Op. cit. suPra, § 71 and 2 BENEDICT, § 223.
99. Kynoch v. The S. C. Ives, 14 Fed. Cas. No. 7958 (D.C. Ohio 1856).
100. 4 BErcEnCT, o0. cit. supra at pp. 199-201 and the notes therein.
101. Gennan v. Carnegie Ill.
Steel Corp., 156 F.2d 977 (3d Cir. 1946); McCarthy
v. Amer. East. Corp., 175 F.2d 724 (3d Cir. 1949); and Balado v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co.,
179 F.2d 943 (2d Cir. 19t0). See also 4 N.A.C.C.A.L.J. 241 (1950). Contra: Skolar v.
Lehigh Valley R. Co., 60 F.2d 893 (2d Cir. 1932).
102. See note 99, supra.
103. 4 BENEDIcT, Op. Cit. sUPra, at 201.
104. The Liberty Bell, 105 F.2d 604 (5th Cir. 1939).
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But this is needless in view of the fact that all the matters in issue can
be disposed of in one proceeding) 0 5 The more recent cases allow the single
proceeding and it is now generally regarded as the modern practice. 06
The seaman injured or becoming ill "in the service of the ship," and
thereby being entitled to maintenance and cure, "has a maritime lien for
.
these."107
The mariner may enforce his right to maintenance and cure by a
libel in remn or in personam (on the Admiralty side of the federal courts)
or he may sue in personam in the state courts or the common law side of
the federal courts under "the saving to suitors" clause. To sue on the
common law side of the federal court requires that there be $3,000 or
more in controversy and that there be diverse citizenship.'l This proposition was asserted by Benedict in his treatise on Admiralty and the courts
have not been averse to follow it.109 There is some authority for the proposition that if the suit for maintenance and cure (of which the jurisdictional
amount is not $3,000) is joined with a cause of action over which jurisdiction has been established, the maintenance and cure cause of action will
not be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.' 0 It is felt that more courts
should embrace this procedure to avoid dismissal of the claim for mnaintenance and cure.
Ifmaintenance and cure is withheld from the seaman to whom it is
due, it can be recovered and the courts will also allow consequential damages
for this failure to pay the maintenance and cure.'
This will also be the
case where the period of payment has ended.' 2 But the shipowner's liability
for maintenance and cure is not limited to an action between himself and
the disabled seaman. Thus, a hospital which has given a seaman maintenance and cure may recover that amount from the shipowner.1 3
A word, more traditional than anything else, is that with arguable
"policy" on both sides of the coin in a hard fact situation such
as that presented in Farrell, we should hope for some golden rule by Congressional
determination or satisfactory International Conference." 4 The latter has
been done,''" but with none too effective a result (Farrell), let alone that
105. 4 BENEDIc'r, o0. cit. supra note 37, at 201.
106. Farrell v. United States, 167 F.Zd 781 (2d Cir. 1948); Brinkman v. Oil
Transport Corp. 1950 A.M.C. 341 (N.Y. Ct. of Appeals, 1949); Cervo v. Isbrandtsen
Co., 178 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1949); Stolper v. United States, 91 F. Supp. 90 (E.D.
Pa. 1950); Hoff v. United Statcs, 87 F.Supp. 909 (V.D. Wash. 1949).
107. PRICE, TiE LAw OF MARITIME LIENS 141 (1940).
108. 4 BENEDICT, OP. cit. Slra at 201; 57 YALE L. J,243, 250-251 (1947); Jordine,
Adm'r v.Wallings, 1951 A.M.C. 43 (3d Cir. 1950).
109. 57 YALE L.J. 243, 251, n.31 (1947).
110. See note 32 supra. See especially the cases collected and discussed in McDonald v.Cape Cod Trawling Corp., 71 F.Supp. 888 (Mass. 1947).
Ill. Sims v.United States, 1951 A.M.C. 461 (3d Cir, 1951).
112. Ibid.
113. Methodist Episcopal Hosp. v. Pacific Transp. Co., 3 F.2d 508 (N.D. Cal.
1920).
114. The same suggestion is made in 23 So. CAL. L.REv. 81, 82 (1949).
115. Shipowners' Liability Convention of October 24, 1936, 54 SrAT. 1693 (1936)
reproduced in 1938 A.M.C. 1297.
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in Farrell Mr. Justice Douglas (dissenting) did point out that Article IV
of the Shipowner's Liability Convention must be fused with Article XII
thereof, the latter giving power to depart from the Convention where there
...

any law, award, custom . . . which insures more favorable conditions

than those provided by the Convention." Congress could affirmatively act
were Article XII held to be non-self-executing, notwithstanding that
Articles I and II of the Convention have been held to be self-executing." 0 , A
solution by Congress would be the most desirable result.
It is disheartening that with such unprecedented injuries as were presented in Farrell, the majority did not take a very sharp step away from
tradition. For their adherence to a principle of a Government of Laws the
majority is to be lauded. But with Farrell perhaps it should be more of
men. Who knows? The Emotion will suffer, tear and wail for the injuries
of William Farrell; the Humanitarian spirit in the soul could make one spin
with despair for that which was denied him. But however noble be the
motive, just how far can it be sacrificed? The result in Farrell leaves much
to be desired and many questions of law unanswered as this paper has
endeavored to bring forth. It seems that Farrell became enmeshed in the
impenetrable webbery of a remedy whose outer fringe had never clearly
been defined and can still be regarded as not completely settled. The nature
of his personal losses makes the result more difficult to swallow. His claim
and position were extreme; that which was opposed to him was too much
to be surmounted. To argue for him necessitates admission that in so doing
first principles will have to be pushed to their extreme. It seems that Farrell
was caught in some sort of trap where his chance of success was thin, but
for that chance he will have to suffer the extreme losses that are his own.
And that being the case, I can only here choose to emotionally end this
writing with the same four words which entered my mind when first I read
the Farrell case. Those words were "Poor, Poor William Farrell."
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